

## Message Text

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TO USDEL VLADIVOSTOK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 258821

EXDIS

TOSEC 325

THE FOLLOWING REPEATS TEL AVIV 6777 ACTION

SECSTATE 22 NOVEMBER 1974. QUOTE:

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 6777

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS, IS

SUBJECT: IDF MOBILIEATION

REF: TEL AVIV 6676

1. I MET WITH FON MIN ALLON AT NOON TODAY TO COVER GROUND ON  
SUBJECT OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY IDF O EMBASSY CONCERNING  
IDF NOV 15 PARTIAL MOBILIZATOON. ALLON HAD ON HIS MIND TODAY'S  
UNGA VOTE AND HAD BEEN STUDYING STATMENTS MADE BY VARIOUS  
UD DELS. HE SAID HE THOUGH AMBASSADOR SCALI'S SPEECH HAD  
BEEN VERY GOOD, BUT THEN MENTIONED A REPORT HE HAD JUST

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RECEIVED FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT US WAS ADVISING

EUROPEANS O BE SATISFIED WITH ABSTENTIONS RAHER THAN PUSHING HARD FOR NEGATIVE VOTES. I SAID FIRMALY I HAD HEARD OF NO SUCH INSTRUCTIONS AND COULD NOT CREDIT THE REPORT. HE SAID HE AGREED WITH ME.

2. I THEN PROCEEDED TO THE REASON FOR MY CALL. I OBSERVED THAT THERE EXISTED A UNIQUE AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, A RELATIONSHIP WHICH INCLUDED THE MILITARY AREA. WE BELIEVED WE BOTH BENEFITED FROM THIS RELATIONSHIP; ISRAEL HAD RECEIVED ESSENIAL EQUIPMENT FROM THE US AND THE US AD BENEFITED GREATLY FROM ISRAELI COOPERATION IN PERMITTING US TO STUY CAPTURED EQUIPMENT AND TO LEARN WHAT TECHNICAL AND STRATEGIC CONCLUSIONS THE ISRAELIS HAD DRAWN FROM THEIR EXPERIENCE IN THE OCTOBER WAR. ALLON QUICKYL SAID THAT HE FULLY AGREED THE US RELATIONSHIP WAS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO ISRAEL AND THAT OUR MILITARY COOPERATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE CLOSE.

3. I REVIEWED BRIEFLY HE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS EARLY NOV 15 WHICH LED THE EMBASSY TO CONCLUDE THAT SOME SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITY APPEARED TO BE TAKING PLACE. I NOTED THAT MY DATT HAD BEEN RECEIVED EARLY IN HE AFTERNOON BY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF GENERAL GAZIT, WHO HAD BRIEFED HIM ON THE INTELLIGENCE WHICH HAD LED THE GOI TO TAKE THE PRECAUTIONARY STEP OF A PARTIAL MOBILIZATION. MY DATT HAD BEEN INFORMED AT THE TIME THAT THIS INVOLVED ONLY A FEW THOURSAND MEN. I SAID WE HAD APPRECIATED THIS BRIEFING VERY MUCH AND WERE AWARE THAT OUR DATT WAS THE ONLY FOREIGN ATTACHE RECEIVING THIS INFORMATION.

AS A RESULT OF DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE WEEKEND, HOWEVER, IT APPEARED THAT THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON WAS NOT ENTIRELY ADQUATE FOR THE PRUPOSES OF US PLANNING AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION. ON MONDAY, NOV 18 WE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO OBTAIN AN UPDATE OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED US ON NOV 15. DATT WAS THEN INFORMED THAT THE IDF HAD NO REASON TO CHANGE THE FIGURES PROVIDE D TO US EARLIER. DATT CONSIDERED THAT AVAILABLE EVIDENCE PINTED TO A SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER MIBILIZATION. IN LIGHT OF TIS, WE CONCLUDED THAT THE REPLY HE HAD RECEIVED REFLECTED IDF RELUCTANCE TO REVEAL

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THE DIMENSIONS OF THE RECALL. I C CONTINUED THAT AS A RESULT OF OUR REPORT OF NOV 18 I HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE SECRETARY TO CLARIFY THE FIGURES CONCERNED. WE FELT ISRAEL HAD EVERY REASON TO BE CONFIDENT THAT SUCH INFORMATION PROVIDED O US WOULD BE HANDLED WITH GREAT DISCRETION AND SO AS NOT TO DAMAGE ISRAEL IN ANY WAY.

4. ALLON LISTENED TO THIS PRESENTATION WITH INTEREST AND

ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY OTHER CASES WHERE I BELIEVED THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED INADEQUATE COOPERATION FROM THE ISRAELIS. I REPLIED BY STRESSING THAT OUR DATT HAD EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THE IDF WHICH HE VALUED HIGHLY, AS I DID, BUT THAT WE BELIEVED THERE WERE OCCASIONS WHEN WE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN FULL INFORMATION ABOUT SITUATIONS OF REAL INTEREST TO US. I EMPHASIZED OUR NEED TO HAVE SUCH INFO-

MATION TO MEET OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, PARTICULARLY IN TENSE SITUATION SUCH AS EXISTED SO OFTEN IN THIS AREA. ALLON SAID HE AGREED WITH MY REMARKS ABOUT THE NEED FOR CANDOR. HE SAID HE HAD ASSUMED THAT ONCE WE WERE NOTIFIED OF THE ISRAELI PARTIAL MOBILIZATION ON NOV 15 THAT MY DATT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE KEPT INFORMED AUTOMATICALLY AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPED. HE SAID HE WOULD CHECK TO ASSURE THAT THIS OCCURRED IN THE FUTURE SINCE HE WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH ME THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE HAVE FULL INFORMATION IN SUCH SITUATIONS.

5. ALLON SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE PRECISE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MOBILIZATION EXERCISE. HE PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN, AND DEFEND, THE GOI DECISION TO PROCEED WITH A PARTIAL MOBILIZATION ON NOV 15. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL FELT IT COULD NOT AFFORD TO BE CAUGHT UNPREPARED MILITARILY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT ISRAEL WOULD HONOR THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION ALLON INSISTED THAT THERE HAD "NEVER BEEN MORE THAN A FEW THOUSAND, ANYWAY, LESS THAN 10,000" MILITARY PERSONNEL CALLED UP IN THE MOBILIZATION. HE LATER MODIFIED THIS TO SAY THAT AT THE PEAK OF THE MOBILIZATION THERE HAD NOT BEEN MORE THAN 6-7 THOUSAND PERSONNEL RECALLED. THE IDF HAD SINCE GONE DOWN TO A MUCH LOWER FIGURE BUT THIS INFORMATION WAS BEING HELD CLOSELY SINCE  
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THEY DID NOT WISH IT TO BE KNOWN OUTSIDE OF ISRAEL. HE SAID HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH DEFMIN PERES AND IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS THESE WOULD BE PASSED TO MY DATT.

6. ALLON THEN ASKED ME HOW MANY MILITARY PERSONNEL OUR INTELLIGENCE HAD ESTIMATED HAD BEEN RECALLED. I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT FEEL FREE TO GIVE HIM THIS INFORMATION BUT THAT IT WAS CONSIDERABLE MORE THAN A FEW THOUSAND. OUR CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT CONCLUDED WITH A RENewed ASSURANCE BY ALLON THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN MORE THAN 6-7 THOUSAND PERSONNEL RECALLED IN THE MOBILIZATION, AND THAT I COULD SO INFORM THE SECRETARY.  
KEATING

UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

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